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Hacking	the	market:	Systemic	contagion	from
cybersecurity	breaches
Virtually	not	a	month	goes	by	without	a	new	disclosure	of	major	cybersecurity	breaches	at	organisational	and
corporate	levels.	An	unrelenting	flow	of	news	in	this	area	takes	us	from	financial	services	companies	to
regulators’	offices,	from	major	utilities	to	transport	corporations.	No	one	seems	to	be	secure,	no	one	is	out	of
reach	for	cyber	criminals.
In	this	year	alone	we	have	learned	about	the	Uber	hack	that	affected	as	many	as	7	million	U.S.	drivers’	records
and	57	million	customers	records.	In	this	case,	we	also	know	the	price	companies	pay	to	‘remedy’	the	hacks:
Uber	reportedly	transferred	$100,000	to	the	hackers	in	exchange	for	a	promise	to	delete	stolen	data.	Whether	or
not	they	complied	in	the	end,	we	simply	do	not	know:	once	stolen,	data	is	virtually	impossible	to	trace,	even	after
a	ransom	is	paid	in	full.
This	September	we	have	also	witnessed	the	discovery	of	the	SEC	hack.	The	Securities	and	Exchange
Commission	–	much	feared	watchdog	of	the	U.S.	financial	markets	–	had	experienced	a	massive	breach	of	its
non-public	corporate	data	storage	system,	known	as	the	Electronic	Data	Gathering,	Analysis	and	Retrieval
system,	EDGAR.	Only	two	weeks	before	that,	Equifax	disclosed	that	in	a	massive	hacking	attack,	the	company
lost	personal	information	of	some	143	million	Americans.
In	its	August	2017	annual	report,	the	National	Infrastructure	Advisory	Council	(NIAC)	noted	that	“Cyber	is	the	sole
arena	where	private	companies	are	the	front	line	of	defence	in	a	nation-state	attack	on	U.S.	infrastructure.	When
a	cyber	attack	can	deliver	the	same	damage	or	consequences	as	a	kinetic	attack,	it	requires	national	leadership
and	close	coordination	of	our	collective	resources,	capabilities,	and	authorities.”	Despite	this	realisation,
according	to	NIAC,	today,	the	U.S.	authorities	and	private	sector	players	“are	falling	short”	of	what	is	needed	to
“support	the	cyber	security	of	high-risk	assets.”
Ironically,	while	the	governments	and	private	sector	leaders	across	the	OECD	countries	appear	to	be	aware	of
the	magnitude	of	the	cyber	security	threats	to	private	and	regulatory	markets	infrastructure,	official	reports	on
cyber	threats	appear	to	be	unconcerned	with	two	key	aspects	of	the	risks	and	uncertainties	surrounding	these
attacks:	their	systemic	nature	and	the	potential	for	contagion	from	cyber	security	threats	against	a	specific
organisation	or	enterprise	to	other	organisations	and	companies	and	broader	markets.	In	fact,	the	two	key	words
“systemic”	and	“contagion”	do	not	feature	together	in	the	literature	relating	to	cyber	security.
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This	is	a	major	oversight	on	behalf	of	all	parties	potentially	affected	by	cyber	security	threats,	from	the
government	security	agencies,	to	regulatory	and	supervisory	agencies,	to	investors	trading	in	the	public	markets.
In	our	recent	paper,	we	looked	at	the	systemic	contagion	effects	from	all	disclosed	cybersecurity	events
experienced	by	the	publicly	listed	companies	over	the	period	starting	with	January	2005	and	ending	April	2015.
We	use	Exponential	GARCH	methodology	to	explore	two	hypotheses	relating	to	cybersecurity	breaches:
(1)	Whether	cybersecurity	events	can	cause	enough	shocks	to	corporate	finance	fundamentals	of	traded
companies	to	trigger	significant	devaluations	of	the	traded	equities;	and
(2)	Whether	such	events	pose	systemic	threats	to	the	broader	financial	markets,	both	domestic	(the	markets	on
which	the	impacted	company	is	listed)	and	international	(financial	exchanges	linked	to	the	domestic	exchange).
Our	findings	are	striking	and	some	are	novel	to	the	literature	on	the	financial	implications	of	the	cybersecurity
threats.
Firstly,	we	show	that	hacking	events	are	becoming	more	prevalent	and	severe	in	terms	of	numbers	of	clients’
record	impacted	since	2010,	when	compared	to	other	cyber	security	breaches,	such	as	loss	of	hardware,	theft	of
data	or	hardware,	and	accidental	releases	of	data,	to	name	but	a	few.	Extending	our	data	to	cover	the	period	of
May	2015	through	September	2017	confirms	this	trend.
Secondly,	our	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	(CAR)	analysis	shows	that	the	average	stock	market	reaction	to
cyber	attacks	in	the	ten-day	window	following	the	events	has	become	increasingly	negative.	Whereas	between
2005	and	2008	the	average	CAR	may	fall	by	3	per	cent,	since	2010	the	same	abnormal	returns	have	fallen	over	5
per	cent,	with	2014	and	2015	presenting	the	largest	average	falls	of	over	10	per	cent	associated	with	hacks.
Again,	extending	the	data	to	2017	confirms	the	trend,	with	average	CAR	declines	rising	in	magnitude	to	12	per
cent.
Thirdly,	our	CARs	analysis	shows	that	stock	markets	increasingly	efficiently	price	the	specific	risk	associated	with
hacking	events,	representing	the	perceived	reputational,	legal	and	regulatory	costs	associated	with	a	breach	in
regulatory	platforms.
Our	main	results,	however,	concern	potential	spillovers	of	volatility	from	cybercrime	events	to	the	affected
company	stock,	to	the	exchange	on	which	the	company	stock	is	traded	and	beyond	that,	to	other	exchanges.
In	Figure	1	below,	we	present	an	analysis	of	the	volatility	effects	that	have	transferred	to	companies	based	on	the
number	of	clients’	records	exposed	and	the	market	capitalisation	of	the	company	that	has	suffered	from	the
cybercrime.	The	data	makes	it	clear	that	there	is	a	significant	positive	correlation	between	the	volatility	impact	and
the	cybercrime	and	the	number	of	clients’	records	exposed:	the	larger	the	scale	of	the	event,	the	larger	the
contagion	transmission.	It	is	also	notable	that	smaller	companies	(in	terms	of	market	capitalisation)	appear	to	be
more	susceptible	to	the	cybercrime.
Figure	1.	Volatility	spillovers	due	to	data	breaches	compared	to	the	company	market	capitalisation	and	number	of	clients
records	affected
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In	our	data,	we	find	that	the	vast	majority	of	the	stock	market	contagion	stemming	from	the	information	release	of
a	cybercrime	event	was	based	on	idiosyncratic	contagion	(instances	where	the	cybercrime	event	has	been
identified	as	unique	to	the	company	rather	than	the	wider	stock	market).
However,	since	late	2014	over	12	per	cent	of	cybercrime	events	resulted	in	systematic	contagion	to	the	wider
national	stock	exchange	in	which	the	company	was	traded.	This	key	finding	can	be	explained	through	the
increased	sophistication	of	cyber-attacks,	increases	in	abnormal	cumulative	losses	to	the	targeted	company,	and
a	significant	rise	in	the	number	of	client	records	that	have	been	illegally	exposed.	In	addition,	the	rise	of	the
Darknet/web	created	an	international	market	in	which	this	data	can	be	readily	sold.
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Systemic	contagion	due	to	cyber	events,	first	detected	in	2014,	remains	a	feature	of	the	market’s	risk
environment	today.	Both,	the	Equifax	breach	and	the	Uber	hack	represent	the	cases	that	by	volume	of	client
accounts	affected	and	the	size	of	company	in	market	capitalisation	terms	serve	as	prime	examples	of	the
cybersecurity	events	that	pose	such	risks.	While	the	jury	is	still	out	on	whether	Uber	disclosure	will	trigger
volatility	spillover	to	other	U.S.-listed	companies,	Equifax	data	clearly	fits	our	model.	Within	the	first	week	of	the
hack	disclosure,	Equifax	stock	dropped	almost	32.3	per	cent.	Thereafter,	the	share	price	recovered,	but	3	weeks
after	the	attack,	Equifax	shares	were	still	trading	at	25.5	per	cent	discount	on	pre-event	price.	Bid-ask	spread	on
shares	also	experienced	substantial	widening,	with	the	spread	rising	by	more	than	50	per	cent	within	the	first
week	of	post-event	trading.	Share	price	volatility	rose	and	there	was	a	clearly	detectable	contagion	from	Equifax
price	dynamics	(volatility)	to	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange.	Two	and	a	half	months	after	the	cyber	breach,
Equifax	shares	continue	to	trade	at	a	23	per	cent	discount.
As	noted	by	NIAC	2017	report,	“The	scale,	scope,	and	frequency	of	cyber	attacks	on	digital	and	physical
infrastructure	systems	is	growing	rapidly.	Threats	are	escalating	as	more	sophisticated	and	organized	attackers
are	designing	targeted	attacks	to	damage	or	disrupt	vital	services	and	critical	physical	systems.”	While	the
authorities	continue	to	focus	much	of	their	resources	on	protecting	physical	infrastructures,	such	as	the	national
grids	and	vital	public	services	provision	platforms,	empirical	evidence	points	to	the	rising	threat	of	financial	impact
contagion	from	cybersecurity	breaches	and	hacks.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	What	the	Hack:	Systematic	Risk	Contagion	from	Cyber
Events	(September	7,	2017)
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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